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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR SECOND DEGREE 
MURDER. 
In addressing the sufficiency of the evidence on 
appeal, this court must review the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. Furthermore, reasonable minds 
must be free from a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the offense. State v. Watts, 675 P.2d 566 (Ut. 1983). In State 
v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Ut., 1983), this court elaborated on the 
standard of review, stating: 
. notwithstanding the presumptions in 
favor of the jury's decision this Court still 
has the right to review the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the verdict. The 
fabric of evidence against the defendant must 
cover the gap between the presumption of 
innocence and the proof of guilt. In 
fulfillment of its duty to review the 
evidence and all inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, the reviewing court 
will stretch the evidentiary fabric as far as 
it will go. But this does not mean that the 
court can take a speculative leap across a 
remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict. 
The evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, 
must be sufficient to prove the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
659 P.2d at 444-445. When the case against an appellant is based 
entirely on circumstantial evidence, a reviewing court may find 
that evidence to be sufficient so long as it excludes every 
reasonable hypothesis of defendant's innocence, State v. Watts, 
supra: State v. Romero, 534 P.2d 216 (Ut. 1976). 
Appellee argues that this standard was not followed in 
Watts. However, in Watts this court did review all of the 
circumstantial evidence and found that the evidence did not 
support the defendant's theories. Appellee also argues that the 
court's analysis in State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Ut. 1985), 
does not employ this reasonable alternative hypothesis discussion 
even though Bailey involved fingerprint evidence. In that case 
the defendant was convicted of a burglary. His fingerprints were 
found on a padlock and a cut out portion of a metal door that was 
the burglar's point of entry into a warehouse. However, the 
fingerprints were not the only evidence admitted against the 
defendant. His accomplice had testified and described the 
burglary in detail. The court found that the accomplice 
testimony alone was sufficient to support the conviction. The 
critical point is that Bailey did not involve only circumstantial 
evidence, consequently, the reasonable alternative hypothesis 
analysis was not appropriate. 
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When a case based entirely on circumstantial evidence 
is reviewed it is necessary for the appellate court to determine 
if the evidence excludes all reasonable inferences of innocence. 
In this case, the strongest evidence tending to tie appellant to 
the crime scene is the fingerprint evidence. Other evidence 
introduced at trial included: Evidence of hair sample 
identification that placed the victim in the appellant's truck. 
That evidence corroborated the testimony of an eyewitness who 
observed the victim and appellant together in Parowan, Utah. 
(Tr. 891-906) A splitting maul found at the crime scene was 
consistent with one appellant had previously owned. (Tr. 837) 
Appellant and Robert Bott both requested that Rita Weatherby 
provide them with an alibi for the date the victim disappeared. 
(Tr. 478-479) Beer cans found at the homicide scene had 
appellant's fingerprints on them and were likely to have been 
purchased at the store where appellant was observed with Sharon 
Sant. 
None of this evidence indicates that it was appellant 
who caused the death of Sharon Sant. The only evidence tending 
to connect appellant with the injury to or death of Sharon Sant 
was the bottle with appellant's fingerprint in blood. With 
respect to that piece of evidence, the bottle itself had been 
manufactured five years before the homicide. (Tr. 861) It was 
an object that was readily moveable and was found in an area that 
was accessible to the public. The blood type found on the bottle 
was consistent with that of both Sant and appellant. (Tr. 989) 
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Appellant had a large scar on the same finger that left the 
print. (Tr. 679-680) The critical aspect about that bottle was 
that there was no other circumstantial evidence to indicate that 
the blood was fresh at the time the bottle was deposited into the 
bush where it was ultimately located. There was no blood in that 
bush, nor was there dirt stuck to the blood on the bottle. (Tr. 
214, 223, 294, 244) Deputy Masner testified that the print could 
have been left any time between the date of manufacture and the 
date the bottle was found. (Tr. 674) Consequently, the evidence 
supports the inferences that the blood on the bottle was 
appellant's and that the blood and fingerprint were left on the 
bottle prior to the homicide. 
The State's theory of the case at trial was that 
appellant had aided in the homicide in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated §76-2-202 (1953 as amended). However, the defendant's 
mere presence at the scene of the commission of the offense or 
prior knowledge that the offense was to be committed is 
insufficient evidence on which to base a conviction. State v. 
Gee, 28 Ut.2d 96, 498 P.2d 662 (1972); State v. Kerekes, 622 
P.2d 1161 (Ut. 1981). In this case, the farthest that the 
evidentiary fabric can be stretched is that the State proved that 
appellant was present at the scene of the homicide. However, to 
prove that appellant participated in the commission of the 
homicide requires a speculative leap that the reasonable 
inferences from all of the evidence fails support. Appellant's 
judgment and conviction should be reversed and the case remanded 
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to the district court with an order to enter a judgment of 
acquittal. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE EFFECT 
OF FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE. 
Appellee contends that the trial court did not commit 
error by refusing to give appellant's requested instruction on 
fingerprint evidence. In its response brief, appellee argued 
that the instruction, as requested, was a comment on the evidence 
and the instruction did not accurately state the law as it 
relates to fingerprint evidence. 
In State v. Sanders, 27 Ut.2d 354, 496 P.2d 220 (1972), 
this court stated that it was improper for the trial judge to 
comment ". . .on the quality or credibility of the evidence in 
such a way as to indicate that he favors the claims or position 
of either party." Ld. at 275. If an instruction unduly 
emphasizes portions of the testimony it may be a comment on the 
evidence, State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101 (Ut. 1985). An 
instruction is not a comment on the evidence if it is stated in 
the abstract and does not tell the jury what the evidence is or 
what the facts are, State v. Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d 193 (Ut. 1976). 
Likewise, an instruction that does not advise the jury on the 
weight to be given a particular item of evidence is not a comment 
on the evidence, State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 (Ut. 1985). 
See: Brief of Appellee, pp. 22-36. 
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The questionable portion of the requested instruction 
in this case stated, "However, if the circumstances are such that 
the print could have been impressed at a time other than that of 
the incident for which the defendant is charged, then you are not 
to consider the fingerprint evidence with respect to the 
defendant's guilt." This proposed instruction merely informs the 
jury of the legal standard for the use of fingerprint evidence. 
See: Chandler v. State, 23 Md.App. 645, 329 A.2d 430 (1974), 
People v. Donahue, 50 Ill.App.3d 392, 365 N.E.2d 710 (1977). In 
State v. Bradley, 309 S.E.2d 510 (N.C.App. 1983), the court held 
that it was error to refuse to give a requested instruction on 
fingerprint evidence. The instruction requested in that case 
indicated that the fingerprint evidence was without probative 
force unless the circumstances showed that it could have been 
impressed at the time the crime was committed. That was no more 
of a comment on the evidence than what was involved in the 
instruction at issue here. 
Even if a portion of the instruction did constitute a 
comment on the evidence, the trial court should not have refused 
to give the instruction in substance. This court has held that 
there is no error if the trial court changes the wording of a 
requested instruction or gives that instruction in substance. 
State v. Rivenburqh, 11 Ut.2d 95, 355 P.2d 689, cert, den. 368 
U.S. 922 (1960); State v. Rosenberg, 35 P.2d 1004 (Ut. 1934). 
The logical extension of this practice is to require trial courts 
to correct improperly worded instructions that correctly address 
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a material issues, Bernhardt v. State, 719 P.2d 832 (Ok.Crim. 
1980). In Colorado trial courts have a positive duty to 
cooperate with counsel and correct the tendered instruction or to 
incorporate the substance of the requested instruction into one 
that is drafted by the court. People v. Weiss, 717 P.2d 511 
(Colo.App. 1985); People v. Moya, 182 Colo. 290, 512 P.2d 1155 
(1973); People v. Bookman, 646 P.2d 924 (Colo. 1982). The 
requested instruction in this case did raise a material issue. 
At a minimum, the trial court had an affirmative duty to strike 
or modify language of the submitted instruction so that the jury 
may be properly instructed on the law. 
Appellee urges this court to adopt the position of the 
Indiana Supreme Court with respect to fingerprint evidence that 
was upheld in State v. Bruce, 375 N.E.2d 1042 (Ind. 1978).3 In 
that case the jury was instructed on the effect of fingerprint 
evidence. The instruction stated that the evidence must show 
either that a fingerprint was impressed at or about the time of 
the homicide, or that the circumstances indicate that the 
fingerprint was left at the time of the commission of the 
offense. The instruction went on to state that if the 
prosecution failed to prove both of these facts, the jury was to 
2 
The failure to modify a requested instruction that is incorrect 
in~form is also analogous to the "plain error" rule which allows 
an appellate court to reverse a conviction on the basis of an 
erroneous jury instruction for which there was no objection or 
request. State v. Cobo. 60 P.2d 952 (Ut. 1936). 
3 
Brief of Appellee at p. 34. 
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determine what weight to give the fingerprint evidence and the 
jury would be justified in not giving the evidence any probative 
value. 
In Bruce, the defendant had also requested that the 
jury be instructed that the prosecution had to explain all 
fingerprints belonging to other people that were found in a place 
that was inaccessible to the general public. The last portion of 
the requested instruction indicated that if the State failed to 
meet all of the requested criteria, the jury could disregard the 
fingerprint evidence. The court found that this last portion 
went too far. By requiring the State to explain the other 
fingerprints and then instructing the jury to disregard the 
evidence if the State failed to make that explanation, denied the 
fingerprint evidence its legitimate weight. 
However, the court held that an instruction on 
fingerprint evidence is required to be given when it is requested 
and is justified by the evidence. The reason that the court gave 
for requiring such an instruction is that jurors may find 
themselves overwhelmed by this type of forensic evidence. The 
court in Bruce approved the substance of the requested 
instruction that was given by the trial court. The court also 
indicated that it would be proper for the jury to be instructed 
that fingerprints serve only to link the owner of the prints to 
the surface on which they were located. Further, the court noted 
that the jury could also be instructed that the weight to be 
given fingerprint evidence depends on the circumstances 
surrounding their impression. 
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Appellee's request that this court adopt the position 
of the Indiana court in Bruce is a concession that the trial 
court should have instructed the jury on fingerprint evidence. 
The critical portions of appellant's requested instruction and 
the instruction given in Bruce are identical (that the 
fingerprints had to have been left at the time the crime was 
committed). By adopting the Bruce position, appellee apparently 
is conceding that the trial court committed error in its failure 
to give an appropriate instruction on fingerprint identification. 
If there was error in failing to instruct the jury on 
fingerprint evidence, the next issue to address is the prejudice 
that arises from that error. As was previously discussed, the 
strongest evidence of appellant's involvement in the commission 
of the homicide was the fingerprint in blood on the bottle found 
at the scene of the homicide. The evidence indicated that 
appellant had a scar on the same finger that left the print. 
(Tr. 679-680) The blood type on the bottle was the same as 
appellant's. (Tr. 989) There was no blood found in the interior 
of the bush where the bottle was located. (Tr. 244) The 
fingerprint expert could not give an opinion on the date that the 
print had been left on the bottle. (Tr. 674) These factors 
coupled with the overwhelming nature of fingerprint evidence make 
it critical that an instruction on fingerprint evidence be 
given. Consequently, the error in failing to give such an 
instruction was prejudicial. Appellant's conviction should be 
reversed and a new trial ordered. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
IN ALLOWING THE STATE TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE 
OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR ASSAULTIVE BEHAVIOR. 
The trial court allowed the State to introduce evidence 
that appellant had struck his live-in girlfriend, Rita Weatherby, 
prior to the homicide. Appellee argued that this evidence was 
introduced to explain why Weatherby gave inconsistent stories to 
investigating officers prior to telling them that appellant had 
4 
requested an alibi for the date that Sharon Sant disappeared. 
Those prior inconsistent statements were elicited from Weatherby 
during the State's direct examination of her. 
There was no objection to the testimony that appellant 
had requested that Weatherby provide him with an alibi. The 
trial court abused its discretion by allowing the state to elicit 
inconsistent statements from the witness for the sole purpose of 
showing that Weatherby was afraid of appellant because of this 
5 
assaultive behavior. This case is distinguishable from State 
v. Bates, 784 P.2d 1126 (Ut. 1989), which was cited by appellee. 
In Bates, the evidence indicated that a sexual abuse victim had 
delayed in reporting that crime. This court held that evidence 
of the defendant's assaultive behavior toward that victim's 
mother was admissible to explain the lapse of the time in 
4 
See: Brief of Appellee at p. 37. 
5 
Prior to the witness testifying a hearing was held on the 
admissibility of this testimony out of the jury's presence (Tr. 
442-447). 
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reporting the crime. The evidence showed why the victim of the 
sexual assault was afraid of the defendant. 
Appellee cites State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Ut. 
1988)
 f and quotes the balancing test that is to be employed to 
determine the admissibility of bad acts evidence. Before such 
evidence is admissible a number of factors must be considered. 
The balancing test employed in Shickles was adopted from E. 
Clearyf McCormick on Evidence, §190 at 565 (3rd ed. 1984). That 
text provides: 
The problem is not merely one of 
pigeonholing, but of classifying and then 
balancing. In deciding whether the danger of 
unfair prejudice and the like substantially 
outweighs the incremental probative value, a 
variety of matters must be considered, 
including the strength of the evidence as to 
the commission of the other crime, the 
similarities between the crimes, the interval 
of time that has elapsed between the crimes, 
the need for the evidence, the efficacy of 
alternative proof, and the degree to which 
the evidence probably will rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility. 
760 P.2d at 295-296. 
When applied to the facts of this case, the balancing 
test in Shickles requires that the bad acts evidence not be 
admitted. The only evidence of the commission of the prior 
assault was the testimony of Weatherby. There was no physical 
evidence nor were there other witnesses to the events. The acts 
of'violence against Weatherby were somewhat similar to some of 
See brief of appellee at 38. 
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the evidence from the scene of the homicide. With respect to 
the time interval between the assault and the homicide, Weatherby 
did not specify when she was struck by appellant; however, it 
would have been within the two months preceding the homicide. As 
for the need for the evidence, there was no objection Weatherby1s 
testimony regarding the request for the alibi. The prior 
statements by the witness did not contribute to the state's case. 
Consequently, there was no need to introduce those statements as 
part of the direct examination of the witness. The purpose in 
introducing this evidence of the witness1 inconsistent statements 
and appellant's bad acts was to prove that the defendant 
physically abused women. The victim of the homicide was a woman. 
The cumulative effect of the evidence would be to "rouse the jury 
to overmastering hostility." The conclusion that must be reached 
is that danger of unfair prejudice from this evidence 
substantially outweighed its probative value. 
There was substantial prejudice involved in the 
introduction of this bad act evidence. Allowing this evidence to 
be introduced at trial was an abuse of discretion. Furthermore, 
the nature of the evidence raises a reasonable likelihood that 
7 
The medical examiner testified that the blood and hair found in 
the roadside gravel at the crime scene indicated that Sharon Sant 
had suffered a blow to the head. 
Q 
Had the defense chosen to impeach Weatherby with the prior 
statements, then the testimony about appellant's assaultive 
behavior would be admissible. This is a tactical decision that 
counsel should make in light of the need to impeach a witness and 
the potential explanation of the inconsistent statements. 
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there was an improper basis for the jury verdict, State v. 
Shickles, supra. Consequently, there is a reasonable likelihood 
that if the evidence had not been introduced, the jury would have 
reached a different verdict, State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879 
(Ut. 1988). The judgment and conviction should be reversed and 
the case remanded to the district court for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence was insufficient to establish the offense 
of second degree murder. This court should order that a judgment 
of acquittal be entered. In the alternative, a new trial should 
be ordered because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on 
the nature of fingerprint evidence and because the trial court 
allowed the State to introduce evidence of appellant's prior 
assaultive behavior. In that trial the jury should be properly 
instructed on fingerprint evidence, and the State should be 
precluded from using the "bad act" evidence. 
DATED this day of December, 1990. 
G. FRED METOS 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE1 
I hereby certify that I mailed/delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant to 
Charlene Barlow, Assistant Attorney General, at 236 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, this day of 
December, 1990. 
ADDENDUM 
INSTRUCTION NO. Q 
The state has offered circumstantial evidence in the 
nature of fingerprint in this case. You are instructed to 
consider this evidence along with all other evidence in making 
your determination of whether the defendant is guilty or not 
guilty of the offense as charged in the information. However, 
before you may find the defendant guilty on the basis of 
fingerprint evidence, you must find that the print is in fact the 
defendant's and that the print was made at the time of the 
incident for which the defendant is charged. However, if the 
circumstances are such that the print could have been impressed 
at a time other than that of the incident for which the defendant 
is charged, then you are not to consider the fingerprint evidence 
with respect to the defendant's guilt. The circumstances to 
consider in determining whether the print was impressed when the 
crime was committed include, but are not limited to, the location 
of the print, the character of the place or premises where the 
print was found and whether the object would be inaccessible to 
the defendant except in the commission of the crime. 
In re Marauez. 560 P.2d 342 (Utah 1977); McLain v. State, 24 
So.2d 15 (Miss. 1945); Borum v. United States, 380 F.2d 595 (D.C. 
App. 1967); United States v. Nazarok, 330 F.Supp. 1054 (E.D. 
Penn. 1971); Fludinq v. State, 4 Md. App. 664, 244 A.2d 909 
(1968); Lawless v. State, 3 Md. App. 652, 241 A.2d 155 (1968). 
